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 5 The Consequences for Incident Analysis 
 Every high-risk industry devotes considerable time and resource to investigating 
and analysing accidents, incidents and near misses. Such industries employ many 
other methods for assessing safety but the identifi cation and analysis of serious 
incidents and adverse events continues to be a critical stimulus and guide for safety 
improvement. Analyses of safety issues always require review of a range of infor-
mation and recommendations should generally not be made on the basis of a single 
event. Nevertheless, an effective overall safety strategy must in part be founded on 
an understanding of untoward events, their frequency, severity, causes and contribu-
tory factors. In this chapter we consider how these analyses might need to be 
extended in the light of the arguments presented in the preceding chapters. 
 What Are We Trying to Learn When We Analyse Incidents? 
 A clinical scenario can be examined from a number of different perspectives, each of 
which may illuminate facets of the case. Cases have, from time immemorial, been used 
to educate and refl ect on the nature of disease. They can also be used to illustrate the 
process of clinical decision making, the weighing of treatment options and, particularly 
when errors are discussed, the personal impact of incidents and mishaps. Incident anal-
ysis, for the purposes of improving the safety of healthcare, may encompass all of these 
perspectives but critically also includes refl ection on the broader healthcare system. 
 A critical challenge for patient safety in earlier years was to develop a more 
thoughtful approach to both error and harm to patients. Human error is routinely 
blamed for accidents in the air, on the railways, in complex surgery and in health-
care generally. Immediately after an accident people make quick judgments and, all 
too often, blame the person most obviously associated with the disaster. The pilot of 
the plane, the doctor who gives the injection, the train driver who passes a red light 
are quickly singled out (Vincent et al.  1998 ). This rapid and unthinking reaction has 
been described by Richard Cook and David Woods as the ‘fi rst story’ (Box  5.1 ). 
However while a particular action or omission may be the immediate cause of an 
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incident, closer analysis usually reveals a series of events and departures from safe 
practice, each infl uenced by the working environment and the wider organizational 
context (Reason  1997 ; Vincent et al.  2000 ). The second story endeavours to capture 
the full richness of the event without the obscuring lens of hindsight and see it from 
the perspective of all those involved which should, ideally, include the perspective 
of the patient and family. 
 We previously extended Reason’s model and adapted it for use in healthcare, 
classifying the error producing conditions and organizational factors in a single 
broad framework of factors affecting clinical practice (Vincent et al.  1998 ; Vincent 
 2003 ). The ‘seven levels of safety’ framework describes the contributory factors and 
infl uences on safety under seven broad headings: patient factors, task factors, indi-
vidual staff factors, team factors, working conditions, organisational factors and the 
wider institutional context (Table  5.1 ).
 This gave rise to a method of incident analysis published in 2000, often referred 
to as ALARM, because it was produced with colleagues from the Association of 
Litigation and Risk Management (Vincent et al.  2000 ). The ALARM approach was 
primarily aimed at the acute medical sector. A later revision and extension in 2004, 
known as the ‘London Protocol’, has been translated into several languages and can 
be applied to all areas of healthcare including the acute sector, mental health, and 
primary care. The method of analysis is known by different names in different coun-
tries, with some continuing to use ALARM and other referring to the London pro-
tocol. We use the term ALARM/LONDON to describe the essential elements of the 
 Box 5.1 First and Second Stories 
 The First Story represents how people, with knowledge of the outcome and 
the consequences for victims and organisations, fi rst respond to breakdowns 
in systems that they depend on. This is a social and political process which 
generally tells us little about the factors that infl uenced human performance 
before the event. 
 First Stories are overly simplifi ed accounts of the apparent cause of the 
undesired outcome. The hindsight bias narrows and distorts our view of prac-
tice after-the-fact. As a result, there is premature closure on the set of con-
tributors that lead to failure. 
 When we start to pursue the Second Story our attention is directed to peo-
ple working at the sharp end of the healthcare system and how human, organ-
isational, technological and economic factors play out to create outcomes. We 
need to understand the pressures and dilemmas that drive human performance 
and how people and organizations actively work to overcome hazards 
(Adapted from Woods and Cook  2002 ) 
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previous versions, which is clumsy but avoids confusion. We also propose a new 
extended model, which we have christened ALARME to indicate the new European 
fl avour that has been infused. 
 The approach developed by James Reason and others has been enormously fruit-
ful and has greatly expanded our understanding of both the causes and prevention of 
harm. The question for us now is whether this perspective needs to be adapted or 
extended in the light of our previous arguments. The current model has been found 
to be effective in many different clinical settings but is primarily aimed at the analy-
sis of relatively discrete events; it may need some revision if we are to also examine 
serious failures and harm that evolves over months or even years. We may need to 
broaden our approach to the investigation and analysis of incidents in a number of 
ways. 
 Table 5.1  The ALARM/LONDON framework of contributory factors 
 Factor types  Examples of contributory factors 
 Patient factors  Complexity and seriousness of conditions 
 Language and communication 
 Personality and social factors 
 Task and technology factors  Design and clarity of tasks 
 Availability and use of protocols 
 Availability and accuracy of test results 
 Decision-making aids 
 Individual (staff) factors  Attitude, knowledge and skills 
 Competence 
 Physical and mental health 
 Team factors  Verbal communication 
 Written communication 
 Supervision and seeking help 
 Team structure (congruence, consistency, 
leadership) 
 Work environmental factors  Staffi ng levels and skills mix 
 Workload and shift patterns 
 Design, availability and maintenance of equipment 
 Administrative and managerial support 
 Physical environment 
 Organisational and management factors  Financial resources and constraints 
 Organisational structure 
 Policy, standards and goals 
 Safety culture and priorities 
 Institutional context factors  Economic and regulatory context 
 Wider health service environment 
 Links with external organisations 
 What Are We Trying to Learn When We Analyse Incidents?
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 Essential Concepts of ALARME 
 The ALARM/LONDON approach set out a methodology and structured approach 
to refl ection on the many factors that may contribute to an incident. During an inves-
tigation information is gleaned from a variety of sources: Case records, statements 
and other relevant documentation are reviewed and interviews are carried out with 
staff and ideally with the patient and family. Once the chronology of events is clear 
there are three main considerations: the care delivery problems identifi ed within the 
chronology, the clinical context for each of them and the factors contributing to the 
occurrence of the care delivery problems. The key questions are: What happened? 
(the outcome and chronology); How did it happen? (the care delivery problems) and 
Why did it happen? (the contributory factors) (Vincent et al.  2000 ). 
 In the context of this book there are four new issues to be considered:
•  First, we need to look at a broader class of events which impact on the patient. 
Some events for analysis need to be selected from the patient’s point of view in 
addition to those identifi ed by professionals. 
•  Second, we need to extend the analysis to examine an episode in the patient 
journey rather than a single incident. The timeframe is widened to include the 
whole ‘event journey’. ALARME proposes an extended approach that applies 
the classic grid of contributory factors to each of the identifi ed care delivery 
problems in the unfolding story of the ‘emerging harm’ considered for initial 
analysis 
•  Third, we need to pay more attention to both successes and failures of detection, 
anticipation and recovery. We need to consider not only problems but also suc-
cess, detection and recovery and how they combine to produce the overall ratio 
of benefi t and harm for the patient. This in turn affects the nature of the learning 
and the subsequent safety interventions that we might recommend 
•  Fourth, we potentially have to adapt both methods of analysis and recommenda-
tions to the different contexts and models of safety 
 Our expanded process of investigation maintains the basic approach of ALARM/
LONDON and the original table of contributory factors, but extends the time frame 
and includes analysis and refl ection on success, detection and recovery (Fig.  5.1 and 
Table  5.2 ). The changes we propose would require signifi cant research and invest-
ment in the development of new methods but we believe this is essential if safety is 
to be effectively managed across clinical contexts.
 Select Problems for Analysis Which Are Important to Patients 
 We already know that patients and families are able to reliably identify adverse 
events that have not been detected by professionals. Patients have been shown in a 
number of studies to report errors and adverse events accurately and to provide 
additional information not available to healthcare professionals. Many 
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patient- identifi ed events are not captured by the hospital incident reporting system 
or recorded in the medical record (Weingart et al.  2005 ; Weissman et al.  2008 ). 
Findings from several patient surveys suggest that patients report a much higher rate 
of errors and adverse events of some kind than the published rates based on hospital 
record review (King et al.  2010 ; Lehmann et al.  2010 ). There is therefore already a 
case for selecting some patient identifi ed incidents for analysis even in hospitals; 
outside hospitals where patients and carers probably have the most comprehensive 
picture of care, the argument is stronger still. 
 We suggest that events considered for analysis should be selected from the 
patient’s point of view as well as by professionals. Tragedies of course deserve full 
and comprehensive investigation, but insights into safety may emerge from many 
types of event. We do not yet know what other kind of events might be identifi ed as 
worthy of investigation by patients and families. What makes an event ‘abnormal’, 
and therefore a potential candidate for analysis, is a complex matter of surprise, rar-
ity, intensity, severity and perhaps also the a basic feeling of the injustice of being 
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injured in a place of safety. The events identifi ed by patients and families may be 
quite different from those identifi ed by professionals. 
 Future reporting systems which seek to involve patients and families will need a 
balance of open-ended narratives and closed-ended questions for cause analysis and 
classifi cation (King et al.  2010 ). Primary care patient reporting studies have used a 
combination of methods such as written, online or telephone reporting and tele-
phone recruitment with a follow up in-person interview. Interviewing patients in 
person is particularly effective when following up hospital patients; the highest 
response rate overall in published studies is 96 %, achieved by in-person patient 
advocate interviews for a specifi c hospital unit. However, there are still many barri-
ers to the use of patient derived information, particularly a lack of support for the 
values of patient centred care, and consequent risk of low value attached to patient 
involvement (Davies and Cleary  2005 ). 
 Widen the Time Frame of Analysis: Review the Patient Journey 
 Many serious events occur because of multiple small failures in the care of a patient 
rather than any single, dramatic failure. Sometimes these individual failures com-
bine at a single time when, for instance, a young doctor is unsupervised at night with 
inadequate equipment, a diffi cult team and a very sick patient. More often though, 
in the care of a patient over time, we see a progressive degradation in care due to a 
combination of errors and system vulnerabilities and sometimes neglect. Advances 
in patient safety are severely hampered by the narrow timeframe used in incident 
detection and analysis. 
 We already understand that after an incident we need to look back to the series of 
events that led up to the problem and which are directly or indirectly linked to it. 
 Table 5.2  New features of ALARME 
 ALARM/LONDON  ALARME 
 Identifi cation and decision to 
investigate 
 Ask patients to tell their story of the episode of care, 
focusing both on what went well and poorly; select 
some of these cases for analysis 
 Select people for investigation team  Include patient and family where possible 
 Organisation and data gathering  Ask patients and family to tell their story and refl ect on 
contributory factors 
 Determine accident chronology  Widen the timeframe to the whole patient journey 
 Identify Care Delivery Problems 
(CDPs) 
 Identify benefi ts of care as well as problems, and 
include detection and recovery from problems 
 Identify contributory factors  Identify contributory factors to each individual 
problem and to detection and recovery 
 Support for patients, families and 
staff not explicitly considered 
 Refl ect and comment on disclosure process and 
support for patients, families and staff 
 Recommendations and developing an 
action plan 
 Select from the full portfolio of strategies and 
interventions 
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Amalberti and colleagues ( 2011 ) have previously argued that we should extent the 
time frame of analysis to consider an ‘event journey’ (Amalberti et al.  2011 ). 
However to examine safety over longer time periods, particularly in community set-
tings, we now believe that we should speak simply of the patient journey. This 
means looking back through the medical history of the patient in search for all 
events that have defi ned the patient’s journey and contributed to the fi nal outcome, 
whether or not these events have been perceived as serious at the time they occurred 
and assessing whether the problem was detected and resolved. Most important of 
all, the event would ideally be examined through the eyes of the patient and family 
as well as the eyes of the professionals. 
 The selection of the time frame of the analysis depends on the conditions suffered 
by the patient, the nature of the problems identifi ed and the complexity of the patient 
journey. Standard episodes of care are easily identifi ed; a hip replacement for instance 
could cover the period between the initial decision to operate and the completion of 
the rehabilitation process. Alternatively, depending on the nature of the safety issues 
identifi ed, one might focus on a particular period such as from the original operation 
through to rehabilitation at home. The most important development is to begin by 
examining a period of care rather than a specifi c incident and its antecedents. 
Consider three different timeframes to detect and analyse events associated with the 
occurrence of complications. The shortest timeframe (A) would cover simple prob-
lems relating to the direct coupling between a wrong action and the immediate con-
sequence to the patient (such as mistaken identifi cation). A somewhat longer 
timeframe (B) would cover the events leading up to a medical complications and its 
subsequent management which might encompass an entire acute care episode from 
initial admission, to discharge and rehabilitation. The longest timeframe (C) might 
cover several months leading up to an avoidable hospital admission, the time spent in 
hospital and subsequent recovery. In-hospital and short-term (30- or 60-day) post-
discharge mortality might be used as a starting point to investigate opportunity tar-
gets, avoidable mortality, and other indicators for complications. 
 The original ALARM/LONDON protocol proposed that, after the initial care 
delivery problems were identifi ed, each should be analysed separately to consider 
the contributory factors (Vincent et al.  2000 ). In a sequence of problems different 
sets of contributory factors may be associated with each specifi c problem. For 
instance a young nurse or doctor might fail to ask for advice about a deteriorating 
patient due to inexperience, poor supervision and defi ciencies in teamwork; in con-
trast the same patient might later fail to receive the correct medication, but this 
might be due to inadequate staffi ng and poor organisation of care. In practice the 
full analysis is seldom done and all the contributory factors are considered together 
as if all were relevant to the single event. However, this more subtle perspective 
becomes much more important with a longer timescale as a series of problems may 
be identifi ed which are clearly separated in time and context. Each of these can be 
separately analysed using the ALARM grid to build up a much more detailed pic-
ture of system vulnerabilities. 
 Figure  5.2 , describing the causes and response to an adverse drug event, pro-
vides an example of the new approach. The example shows the triple value of 
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ALARME: fi rst gathering the story of the event journey from the patient’s per-
spective to give a more complete account; second, widening the scope of the anal-
ysis to the full patient journey to include pre-admission and events after discharge 
from hospital; third identifying and analysing other usually disregarded events to 
reveal the cumulative impact of poor care, initial deterioration and eventual 
recovery.
 This broader approach will require a new type of meeting (probably video 
conference) covering longer periods in the patient’s medical history and involving 
the participation of both hospital and community practitioners. It would also 
require the development of new indicators and electronic traces, such as tools to 
monitor individual patients’ lab results, to record the nature and duration of all 
breakdowns in the continuum of care. A full picture would require tracking the 
treatment of all the disorders from which the patient suffered not just single 
diseases. 
End
StartMrs X, 58, is sent to the hospital 
by her GP for a hallux - valgus 
surgery. For many years she has 
taken metfomine 1000 mg twice 
daily to control her diabetes .
The surgery went well. In the 
recovery room the anaesthetist 
prescribed: thromboprophylaxis, 
painkillers, capillary draw test for 
blood glucose monitoring, and 
added ‘resume personal treatment 
at night’.  These instructions were 
followed but incompletely recorded 
in the medical notes.   
The blood glucose levels fell 
progressively from 1.2 to 0.8 on 
the evening of day 3 without 
concerning the nurses (below 0.7 
was the accepted value to alert 
doctors). 
She was scheduled for discharge 
on day 4, but she felt ill at 5 am 
that day, and rapidly fell into a 
coma. 
She was transferred to ICU and 
diagnosed with very serious 
diabetic ketoacidosis. When 
reviewing her medication is 
became clear that she had taken 
metformine x 6 for 3 days. 
She recovered 4 days later from 
ICU, and was discharged  home 
on day 13, 9 days after her 
expected discharge date.   
Mrs X. saw the Anaesthesiologist 2 
weeks before surgery. He said that 
she should come to the hospital 
with a fresh doctor’s prescription 
from her GP, because she only had 
a loosely crumpled paper.  
She saw her GP the day before 
surgery without an appointment. 
The GP saw her in the corridoor 
and rapidly wrote a fresh 
prescription. Under pressure the 
GP mistakenly wrote metformine 
1000 mg x2 x3.
Mrs X did not realise she was also 
being prescribed metformine on the 
ward since the pills given by the 
staff were different (generic) and 
nobody told her what drugs she 
was being given.
Her family reported that she felt ill 
on day 2, becoming tired and 
irritable at day 3. The nurse said it 
was normal after surgery, gave her 
a sedative and suggested resting.
The hospital staff never explained 
why she became so ill saying only 
that her diabetes had 
decompensated because of the 
surgery and a reaction to 
metformine. Only the GP 
apologised 2 weeks later.  
She still gets very anxious about 
her diabetes. It took 6 months after 
discharge to recover her well-being. 
She now has to see an 
endocrinologist every three months 
for a period of 2 years.   
The story as told 
by the patient
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 Success and Failure in Detection and Recovery 
 In most systems errors are relatively frequent but few impact on safety because of 
the capacity of humans and organisations to recover from errors. In aviation, for 
example, numerous studies show that professional pilots make at least one clear 
error per hour, whatever the circumstances and the quality of the workplace design 
(Helmreich  2000 ; Amalberti  2001 ). The great majority of errors made are rapidly 
detected by the person who made them, with routine errors being better detected 
than mistakes. Experts of course make fewer errors overall than novices but the best 
marker of high level expertise is the detection of error rather than its production. 
Success in detection of errors is the true marker of expertise, while error production 
is not. Detection and recovery are sensitive to high workload, task interruptions, and 
system time management (Amalberti et al.  2011 ; Degos et al.  2009 ). 
 What are the implications for safety and for the analysis of incidents? We com-
monly assume that the best way to make a system safer is to reduce the number of 
errors and failures. This is, in many cases, entirely reasonable. Automation for 
instance, or reminder systems, can have a massive impact on minor errors. A more 
organized handover process might enhance the transfer of essential information. 
However eliminating all errors, which would mean considerably restricting human 
behaviour, is not possible and arguably not desirable. 
 We need in practice to distinguish errors that have immediate consequences for 
the patient and those which can be considered as minor deviations in the work pro-
cess which can be noticed and corrected. The fi rst class of errors do indeed need 
formal, rigorous rules to protect the patient, such as clear protocols for the manage-
ment of electrolytes or multiple and redundant patient identifi cation checks. For the 
many millions of other minor errors it is more effi cient and effective to rely on 
detection and recovery by means of self-awareness and good coordination and com-
munication within the team. These fi ndings also suggest that reliable human-system 
interaction will be best achieved by designing interfaces that minimize the potential 
for control interference and support recovery from errors. In other words, the focus 
should be on control of the effect of errors rather than on the elimination of error per 
se (Rasmussen and Vicente  1989 ). 
 The standard approach for incident analysis in healthcare has primarily focused 
on identifying the causes and contributory factors of the event, with the idea that this 
will allow us to intervene to remove these problems and improve safety. These strat-
egies make perfect sense in any system which is either highly standardised or at 
least reasonably well controlled, since there it is clearly possible to implement 
changes that address these vulnerabilities. The recommendations from many analy-
ses of healthcare incidents are essentially recommendations to improve reliability 
(such as more training or more procedures) or to address the wider contributory 
factors such as poor communication or inadequate working conditions. In all cases 
we attempt, quite reasonably, to make the system more reliable and hence safer. 
 We could however expand the scope of the inquiry and the analysis. There is much 
to learn from the ability of the system to detect and recover from failures and close calls 
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(Wu  2011 ). For example, in addition to identifying failures and contributory factors we 
could instead ask ‘what failures of recovery occurred in the care of this patient?’ and 
‘how we can we improve detection and recovery in settings such as these?’ This would 
have implications both for our understanding of events and, more importantly, for the 
recommendations which follow such analyses which might expand to include a much 
stronger focus on developing detection and recovery strategies. 
 Adapting the Analysis to Context 
 In addition to the developments described above we believe that we may also have to 
extend our thinking by adapting methods of analysis to the different contexts and 
models of safety we have outlined. We should be clear at this point that we do not, as 
yet, know how to do this. Many authors, particularly Erik Hollnagel, have drawn 
attention to the need for a wider array of accident models which are better adapted to 
fl uid and dynamic environments (Hollnagel  2014 ). However we do not as yet have 
suffi cient understanding to match models to environments and we have certainly not 
developed practical methods of analysis which are customized to different contexts. 
 We can however begin to consider what such an analysis might look like. Suppose 
we analyse an accident in a very risky unstructured environment – this might be 
deep sea fi shing or an incident that occurred in home care involving someone with 
serious mental health problems. Are we looking for the same kind of causes and 
contributory factors as we are in a much more structured environment? The factors 
might be different and also the balance of factors might be different. For instance 
the framework of contributory factors (Vincent et al.  1998 ) identifi es patient factors 
as a potential contributor to an incident. In a highly standardized environment, such 
as radiotherapy department, personal characteristics play a much less important role 
than in situations in which a person is responsible for their own care. People with 
serious mental health or cognitive problems are also clearly at higher risk of making 
drug errors in their own care. So, the relevance and infl uence of different types of 
contributory factors should be different in different contexts. This has, as far as we 
know, not been addressed empirically but should be entirely feasible. The next step 
is to ask if we should, in different contexts, be identifying different kinds of recom-
mendations depending on the clinical context. This in turn depends on how one 
believes safety is achieved and realised in different settings. However before we can 
fully consider this issue we need to set out our proposals for a strategic approach to 
safety interventions addressed in the following chapters. 
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 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
 Key Points 
•  Every high risk industry devotes considerable time and resource to investi-
gating and analysing accidents, incidents and close calls. 
•  Effective incident analysis requires a framework which includes guidance 
on the selection of incidents, and how the investigation and analysis should 
be conducted. 
•  Our current framework (known both as ALARM and London Protocol) for 
incident analysis in medicine: (i) identifi es events for analysis chosen by 
professionals (ii) is based on an underlying safety model examining causes 
and contributory factors and (iii) uses the ‘seven levels of safety’ frame-
work to guide the identifi cation of contributory factors and potential 
interventions. 
•  The current framework remains relevant, but needs to be signifi cantly 
adapted to refl ect the new safety challenges. 
•  We need to include events that refl ect harm in the eyes of patients who may 
identify problems that are not necessarily seen by professionals. 
•  We need to develop an approach which refl ects the importance of poor care 
evolving over time, which in turn affects the nature of the learning and 
subsequent safety strategies that we implement. 
•  We propose a new approach to incident analysis (ALARME) which con-
siders contributory factors along the whole patient journey and which 
includes attention to successes, failures, recovery and mitigation. 
•  This new approach to incident analysis involves the participation of the 
patient and family and both hospital and community practitioners. It may 
require the inclusion of new information such as the patient’s personal 
story of illness and individual laboratory results over time. 
•  The changes we propose would require signifi cant research and investment 
in the development of new methods but we believe this is essential if safety 
is to be effectively managed across clinical contexts. 
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